Comparing Federal Courts  Paradigms . by Fallon Jr., Richard H.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary
1995
Comparing Federal Courts "Paradigms".
Richard H. Fallon Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Fallon Jr., Richard H., "Comparing Federal Courts "Paradigms"." (1995). Constitutional Commentary. 889.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/889
COMPARING FEDERAL COURTS 
"PARADIGMS" 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr.* 
In a recent article, Professor Michael Wells attacks what I 
had characterized as "the Hart and Wechsler paradigm" for anal-
ysis of Federal Courts issues.l To summarize crudely, Wells 
claims that the Hart & Wechsler paradigm, which we agree re-
flects the still dominant approach to Federal Courts scholarship, 
is descriptively impoverished and normatively inadequate, and 
he offers a "pragmatic" alternative. Wells's article raises impor-
tant issues for those who teach and write about Federal Courts 
law. His essay also calls attention to questions about the notion 
of examining legal issues by reference to a "paradigm" that are 
equally pertinent to other subject matters. A brief response, ad-
dressed to some of these issues, therefore seems warranted. 
I. BACKGROUND 
In an article entitled Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler 
Paradigm,z I maintained that Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler 
had established the reigning Federal Courts "paradigm"3 and at-
tempted to identify its central elements. In the loose sense in 
which I used the term-reflecting an admittedly vulgar adapta-
tion of Thomas Kuhn's concept of a scientific "paradigm"4-a 
paradigm is a set of assumptions that defines a series of problems 
* Professor of Law, Harvard University. I am grateful to Daniel Meltzer for com-
ments on an earlier draft and to Melissa Hart for her research assistance. 
1. Michael Wells, Busting the Hart & Wechsler Paradigm, 11 Const. Comm. 557 
(1994). 
2. 47 Vand. L. Rev. 953 (1994). 
3. The central work in which they did so was of course Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Her-
bert Wechsler, eds., The Federal Courts and the Federal System (Foundation, 1953), but I 
read that book in light of Hart's and Wechsler's other writings. The Hart & Wechsler 
casebook has gone through two subsequent editions. The second edition, published in 
1973, was edited by Paul Bator, Paul Mishkin, David Shapiro, and Herbert Wechsler. The 
third and current edition, which came out in 1988, was edited by Paul Bator, Daniel Melt-
zer, and David Shapiro. For an insightful assessment of the casebook's evolution, see 
Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 688 (1989). 
4. See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (U. of Chicago 
Press, 2d ed. 1970). 
3 
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worth solving and a framework within which to seek answers.s 
So conceived, the Hart & Wechsler paradigm has two main ele-
ments. The first defines the field of study. As framed by Hart & 
Wechsler, Federal Courts issues characteristically involve the ap-
propriate allocation of power to decide legal questions authorita-
tively.6 For example, which tribunals should have what authority 
to decide which questions, and subject to what standard of 
review?' 
The second aspect of the Hart & Wechsler paradigm, I ar-
gued, consists of a set of largely methodological assumptions-
associated generally with the Legal Process school-about how 
questions such as these should be answered. For present pur-
poses, the most basic of these assumptions is what I termed "the 
antipositivist principle":s 
"[W]e should understand the 'law' bearing on allocations of 
institutional responsibility as a rich, fluid, and evolving set of 
norms for effective governance and dispute resolution, not as a 
positivist system of fixed and determinate rules .... [L]egal 
interpretation should be purposive, not rigid or mechanical, 
and the variety of sources of law to which a legal interpreter 
can appeal includes principles and policies as well as canonical 
texts." 
Given the fluidity implied by the antipositivist principle, judges 
and lawyers need interpretive guidance. "The principle of struc-
tural interpretation" and "the principle of the rule of law" re-
spond to this demand. The principle of structural interpretation 
provides that "[i]n disputes about the proper allocation of deci-
sion-making authority, the principles and policies underlying fed-
eralism and the separation of powers deserve special weight. "9 
The principle of the rule of law implies that "courts have irreduc-
ible functions"to and "requires the availability of judicial reme-
dies sufficient to vindicate fundamental legal principles."11 Two 
further principles, "the principle of reasoned elaboration"12 and 
"the neutrality principle,"t3 indicate generally that courts should 
strive to give reasoned justifications for their decisions.14 As 
5. See id. at 23-51. 
6. See Fallon, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 962-63 (cited in note 1). 
7. See Amar, 102 Harv. L. Rev. at 691 (cited in note 3). 
8. Fallon, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 965 (cited in note 2). 
9. Id. at 965. 
10. Id. at 966. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
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Wells correctly points out, the conjunction of the latter two prin-
ciples implies an ideal of legal "coherence" or "integrity."ts The 
final methodological assumption of the Hart & Wechsler para-
digm, the "principle of institutional settlement," recognizes "the 
claim to legitimacy of thoughtful, deliberative, unbiased decisions 
by government officials who are reasonably empowered to make 
such decisions." 
In my earlier article, I attributed these interpretive princi-
ples to the first edition of the Hart & Wechsler casebook, read in 
light of the equally famed Legal Process materials published only 
a few years later by Henry Hart and Albert Sacks.16 But I also 
claimed that the Hart & Wechsler paradigm continues to define 
the subject matter of Federal Courts as a field of academic in-
quiry and, more importantly, that its Legal Process methodologi-
cal assumptionst7 tend to be shared by most contemporary 
scholars working in the area. Wells accepts the characterization 
of contemporary Federal Courts teaching and writing as 
predominantly occurring within the Hart & Wechsler paradigm 
or imbued with Legal Process assumptions. The principal inter-
est of his article lies in its criticisms of modem scholarship, not in 
his historical interpretations, and I wish to respond in the same 
terms. 
II. "JURISDICTIONAL POLICY" AND SUBSTANTIVE 
REASONING 
Wells argues that Hart & Wechsler's Legal Process paradigm 
fails to provide an accurate or predictively useful account either 
of Federal Courts doctrine or of judicial decisionmaking.ts In his 
view, the law is rife with contradictory principles and irreconcila-
ble decisions. This "incoherence" results, he thinks, because 
judges frequently decide cases with the aim of promoting sub-
stantive goals, such as achieving broader or narrower interpreta-
tions or more or less efficacious enforcement of substantive 
federal rights. On his reading, the reigning approach excludes 
such "substantive" factors from consideration and assumes that 
15. See Wells, 11 Const. Comm. at 560 (cited in note 1). 
16. Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the 
Making and Application of Law (Cambridge, Mass., Tentative ed. 1958). The Hart and 
Sacks materials as edited by Professors William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, 
were recently published by Foundation Press in 1994. 
17. The Hart & Wechsler paradigm for the resolution of Federal Courts issues could 
fairly be termed a "Legal Process paradigm." See Fallon, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 969-70 
(cited in note 2). 
18. See Wells, 11 Const. Comm. at 558 (cited in note 1). 
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decisionmaking is based exclusively on "jurisdictional policy,"t9 a 
category in which he puts such values as respect for federalism 
and the separation of powers, "finality," "uniformity," and 
"avoidance of unnecessary constitutional decisions. "zo 
Although Wells's characterization of the Hart & Wechsler 
paradigm generally observes the principle of interpretive charity, 
his distinction between "substantive" and "jurisdictional" policy 
is crabbed and misleading. No sensible partisan of the Hart & 
Wechsler paradigm thinks that "jurisdictional policy" could be as 
innocent of substantive concerns as he maintains that the para-
digm demands. On the contrary, the richness of the Legal Pro-
cess approach resides in its sensitivity to the subtle interactions of 
and overlap between substantive and procedural interests in ju-
risdictional decisions.21 Consider some of the most basic Federal 
Courts issues, as framed by the "canon" that Hart & Wechsler 
helped to promote.22 As established by Martin v. Hunter's 
Lessee,23 Supreme Court review of state court judgments exists 
partly to ensure against state court nullification of federal rights. 
Habeas corpus jurisdiction serves a similar purpose, as does fed-
eral "protective jurisdiction" -a concept that Hart & Wechsler 
helped to launch.24 
Several of Wells's own examples make the point equally 
clearly. The question whether there should be "citizen" standing 
to enforce the Establishment Clause is essentially one about what 
rights people do or ought to have.zs It is impossible to decide 
without reference to substance. No element of the Hart & 
Wechsler paradigm suggests otherwise. Should there be a federal 
cause of action for damages to redress constitutional violations 
committed by federal officials? The efficacy of constitutional en-
forcement is directly at stake; no sensible person would suggest 
the contrary. Some will view heightened enforcement as more or 
less important in comparison with other concerns, such as wor-
ries about vexatious litigation, the chilling of officials acting in 
19. Id. at 564. 
20. ld. 
21. See Vincent A. Wellman, Dworkin and the Legal Process Tradition: The Legacy 
of Hart & Sacks, 29 Ariz. L. Rev. 413 (1987) (emphasizing the Legal Process principle 
that interpretation should be purposive and should be sensitive to considerations of prin-
ciple and policy immanent in the entire body of law and the surrounding legal culture). 
22. See Judith Resnik, Rereading "The Federal Courts:" Revising the Domain of Fed-
eral Courts Jurisprudence at the End of the Twentieth Century, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1021, 1036 
(1994). 
23. 14 u.s. 304 (1816). 
24. See Fallon, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 973-74 & n. 86 (cited in note 2). 
25. See William Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 Yale LJ. 221 (1988). 
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reasonable good faith, and proper deference to Congress's law-
making prerogatives. But what Wells calls "substance" is clearly 
a part of the mix. 
Similar blends of substance and procedure occur with re-
spect to issues involving federalism. And again, far from obscur-
ing the resulting complexity, the Hart & Wechsler paradigm 
invites painstaking attention to the layered complexity that 
marks the intersection of diverse influences. When, if ever, 
should federal courts enjoin pending state proceedings? If au-
thority exists, it exists under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because a Recon-
struction Congress thought that state courts could not always be 
trusted to enforce the federal Constitution. Is it wrong for Con-
gress to make a substantive judgment such as this? Clearly not. 
In the words of Paul Bator, article III contemplates that the 
scope of federal jurisdiction should reflect political judgments 
made by Congress from time to time.26 Can contemporary fed-
eral courts implement section 1983 without weighing the extent 
to which state courts and agencies are likely to provide fair and 
sympathetic fora for the vindication of federal rights? Although 
others might disagree, I do not think so. The relevant historical 
materials are conflicted; policy factors deserve attention.27 
Moreover, within the realm of policy, if a federal court is not 
likely to construe constitutional rights more broadly or enforce 
them more efficaciously, there is no good reason to allow a fed-
eral injunction. Yet if a federal court is indeed more likely to do 
so, questions arise not only about the costs of disrupting state 
proceedings, but about whether broad interpretations of consti-
tutional rights are good or bad, correct or incorrect. Recall the 
frequency with which federal injunctions thwarted state imple-
mentation of regulatory legislation during the Lochner era-a 
recollection that undoubtedly influenced the relative friendliness 
of the original Hart & Wechsler casebook to adjudication by 
state courts and even administrative agencies.28 
I can think of only two reasons why Wells might imagine 
that Hart & Wechsler's Legal Process paradigm wholly excludes 
what he calls "substantive" considerations. One involves the par-
adigm's implicit assumption that substantive concerns, although 
often relevant, are frequently entangled with other elements and 
that the substance that matters most may be long-term and ag-
26. See Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power Over the Jurisdiction of the Federal 
Courts, 27 Viii. L. Rev. 1030, 1030-31 (1981-82). 
27. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 Va. L. Rev. 
1141 (1988). 
28. See Fallon, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 974-74 & n. 86 (cited in note 2). 
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gregate rather than short-term and specific. For example, in the 
case in which an injunction is sought against state proceedings, 
the constitutional claim may be valid or frivolous, and the state 
tribunal may appear receptive to or biased against federal rights. 
But the jurisdictional rule must be defined with the generality of 
cases in mind. Within the Hart & Wechsler paradigm, substance 
matters, but it does not typically collapse into a ruling on the 
substantive claims of a particular case, devoid of broader con-
cerns about sensible, rule-based allocations of jurisdiction.29 
A second possible explanation for Wells's mistaken view 
that the Hart & Wechsler paradigm rigidly excludes "substan-
tive" considerations arises from the traditional intellectual oppo-
sition between "realism" and "formalism." Wells's is largely a 
realist critique, and it may be natural to assume that the target 
must therefore be formalist. But to equate Hart & Wechsler's 
Legal Process paradigm with formalism is demonstrably mis-
taken. On the contrary, the Legal Process School reflected an 
effort to absorb the realist critique of formalism while maintain-
ing a meaningful conception of the rule of law.30 In the open-
ended sense in which I used the term, which Wells purports to 
accept, the Hart & Wechsler paradigm rejects a deductive model 
of legal reasoning and instead exalts reasonableness, purposive 
reasoning, and reason-giving as the characteristic elements of the 
judicial process. What I characterized as "the anti-positivist prin-
ciple," which Wells agrees is a central element of the prevailing 
approach, could hardly be clearer on this point. 
III. DESCRIPTION, PREDICTION, AND THE POINT OF 
THE PARADIGM 
Wells's insistence that the Hart & Wechsler paradigm ex-
cludes considerations of "substance" forms only a part of his ar-
gument that the paradigm is descriptively inadequate. According 
to him, Federal Courts law is conflict-ridden and "incoherent."3t 
For example, the Supreme Court sometimes portrays constitu-
tional adjudication as permissible only insofar as strictly neces-
sary to resolve a concrete dispute between adverse individuals; in 
other cases, the Court waives or qualifies traditional require-
ments of justiciability and treats the declaration of constitutional 
29. See id. at fJ"/3-75. There may be some complete or partial exceptions, such as a 
case presenting a question of standing to enforce a particular constitutional provision. 
30. See, for example, William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of 
The Legal Process, 107 Harv. L.. Rev. 2031 (1994). 
31. See Wells, 11 Const. Comm. at 561 (cited in note 1). 
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norms as an essential judicial function. Similarly, some decisions 
rest on the premise that state courts should be presumed as fair 
and competent as federal courts in enforcing federal rights, while 
others assume the superiority of federal courts. In Wells's view, 
disparities such as these indicate that judges cannot really be at-
tempting to engage in reasoned elaboration or to decide cases on 
a consistently principled basis. It follows, he reasons, that a para-
digm including a "principle of reasoned elaboration" and a "neu-
trality principle" cannot be descriptively accurate. 
A. THE NATURE OF TIIE HART & WECHSLER PARADIGM 
If the central principles of the Hart & Wechsler paradigm 
could be falsified by doctrinal conflict between competing values, 
Wells would indeed be correct that it is descriptively deficient. In 
fact, however, Wells's criticisms rest on a misunderstanding 
about what the Hart & Wechsler paradigm, as I portrayed it, 
either is or is for. 
In the first place, I am doubtful that the Hart & Wechsler 
paradigm, in the sense in which I have used the term, is either 
purely descriptive or purely normative. It is more nearly "inter-
pretive," to use Ronald Dworkin's term,32 in its combination of 
descriptive and normative elements.33 Somewhat more precisely, 
the Hart & Wechsler paradigm models some of the analytical 
norms that help to constitute existing legal practice. But those 
norms, as so reflected in practice, are frequently amorphous, am-
biguous, and conflicted. In this situation, the Hart & Wechsler 
paradigm attempts to identify the norms that most deserve re-
spect or merit extension into the future. Henry Hart, in particu-
lar, was eloquent on this point.34 
32. See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 45-113 (Belknap Press, 1986). 
33. Although it might appear anachronistic to impute Dworkin's approach to Hart 
& Wechsler, the affinities between Dworkin and the Legal Process school are sufficiently 
strong that Professor Wellman has characterized Dworkin's theory as a "legacy" of the 
Legal Process tradition. See Wellman, 29 Ariz. L. Rev. 413 (cited in note 21). 
34. See, for example, Henry M. Hart, Jr., Holmes's Positivism-An Addendum, 64 
Harv. L. Rev. 929, 930 (1951) (arguing that "[l]aw as it is is in a continuous process of 
becoming" and that, since morality has a part in influencing what the law becomes, it is a 
part of what law already is); Henry M. Hart, Jr., Thomas Reed Powell, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 
804, 804 (1956) ("you could not think straight about the law unless you thought about its 
purposes and took sides on hard questions about which purposes should be furthered and 
which not"); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Fed-
eral Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362 (1953) (distinguishing be-
tween misguided decisions of the Supreme Court and the body of principle that reflects 
the moral heritage of the political order and constitutes its more fundamental and endur-
ing law). 
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Conceived in this way, the Hart & Wechsler paradigm 
makes descriptive claims: it purports to reflect the legal reason-
ing of our constitutional order, not that of some utopia. But the 
paradigm does not pretend to be descriptive or predictive in the 
way that Wells sometimes assumes. Rather than being a set of 
claims about the nature of existing doctrine or an algorithm for 
predicting how cases will be decided, the methodological as-
sumptions of the Hart & Wechsler paradigm are largely internal 
to and constitutive of legal reasoning about Federal Courts is-
sues. To put the point slightly differently, the Hart & Wechsler 
paradigm reflects an insider's largely internalized standards of 
what is sayable and unsayable, relevant and irrelevant, persua-
sive and unpersuasive in legal arguments about Federal Courts 
issues.3s The paradigm also captures ideals of judicial decision-
making. Within this account, coherence or principled consistency 
is an internal, constitutive ideal: judges and lawyers seek uniting 
and controlling principles and develop distinctions, as they must, 
to explain why some cases and fact situations are governed by 
one principle, some by another. 
If this account is correct, Wells is right to insist that the Hart 
& Wechsler paradigm makes at least an implicit claim that its 
principles exercise motivational influence over lawyers and 
judges. Moreover, good legal reasons, as defined by the para-
digm, should provide at least some bases (though frequently in-
determinate ones) on which to predict the outcomes of 
authoritative decisionmaking. But the paradigm's principal de-
scriptive reference points involve norms of argument and reason-
ing, not doctrinal patterns. 
B. THE BASIS FOR CRITICISM 
Understood to reflect a partly idealized interpretation of 
some of the constitutive norms and ideals of legal argument, the 
Hart & Wechsler paradigm remains subject to attack on descrip-
tive grounds. For example, a behaviorist might deny that reasons 
are ever effective causes of action and attempt to develop a the-
ory based on stimulus and response. Or, accepting that reasons 
are sometimes psychologically effective, someone might deny 
that the particular assumptions and ideals embodied in the Hart 
35. This characterization is informed not only by Ronald Dworkin's Law's Empire 
(cited in note 32), but also by H.L.A. Hart's distinction between "internal" and "external" 
perspectives on rules. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 86-88 (Oxford U. Press, 2d 
ed. 1994). 
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& Wechsler paradigm are in fact characteristic of legal reasoning 
about Federal Courts issues. 
Wells's argument appears to be different. He seems to ac-
cept that Hart & Wechsler's Legal Process assumptions and ide-
als provide reasons bearing on the resolution of Federal Courts 
issues, but maintains that they are weaker reasons than the para-
digm assumes,36 and he asserts that a more descriptively accurate 
paradigm would identify what the other, more powerful reasons 
are.37 This is surely a plausible view. It is entirely imaginable, 
for example, that lawyers and especially judges might retain 
forms of argument suggesting that coherence and reasoned justi-
fication are animating, even constitutive ideals, while under-
standing perfectly well that departure from those ideals was in 
fact accepted within the profession as normal and appropriate in 
at least some cases.3s 
If I have characterized Wells's position correctly, however, 
there is less to his descriptive critique than meets the eye. In the 
first place, as I have suggested already, he seems to acknowledge 
that the Hart & Wechsler paradigm furnishes the best available 
starting point for constructing a better theory. He agrees that the 
methodological principles of the Hart & Wechsler approach have 
some action-guiding or motivating force; the challenge, in his 
view, is not to abandon the assumptions of the Hart & Wechsler 
model but to supplement them, and to identify the relative ac-
tion-motivating force of different factors. 
Second, again as I have indicated, the Hart & Wechsler 
model, appropriately understood, excludes far fewer "substan-
tive" considerations than Wells suggests. Once substance enters 
the picture, it of course becomes predictable that judges and Jus-
tices who have an expansive conception of the Establishment 
Clause, for example, will favor a broader law of standing to pres-
ent Establishment Clause challenges than will those with a nar-
rower conception. It also becomes possible for anyone who 
works within the Hart & Wechsler paradigm to take such consid-
erations into account when prediction is her purpose. In short, 
the Hart & Wechsler paradigm by no means thwarts "realist" 
36. See Wells, 11 Const. Comm. at 569-70 (cited in note 1). 
37. See id. at 580-85. 
38. Compare Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 Harv. J.L. & Pub. 
Pol. 645, 674-79 (1991) (developing a theory of "presumptive positivism" according to 
which judges characteristically do and should follow established legal rules and conven-
tions unless to do so would conflict egregiously with a value or policy of supervening 
importance). 
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prediction of the kind that Wells thinks so important.39 On the 
contrary, I would guess that nearly any of the able people that 
Wells associates with the paradigm are quite adept at predicting 
judicial outcomes. 
C. THE PoiNT 
I should return briefly, however, to what I take to be the 
central point of my disagreement with Wells. Although anyone 
can of course employ the Hart & Wechsler paradigm in predict-
ing how a court will decide a particular case, the paradigm's prin-
cipal function is not to predict outcomes, but to suggest, invoke, 
and elucidate some of the norms that help to constitute legal ar-
gument about Federal Courts issues in a legal culture in which 
argument and disagreement are characteristic phenomena. The 
Hart & Wechsler paradigm also serves an important pedagogical 
function of imbuing students with some constitutive conventions 
of legal argument. 
Whether this type of "descriptive" reference is the best one 
for the study of Federal Courts issues, or indeed of any legal sub-
ject matter, is a deep, interesting, and important question. Cer-
tainly anyone with a critical agenda might wish to broaden the 
framework, to attempt to describe a systematic relationship be-
tween Federal Courts doctrine and, for example, the class inter-
ests or characteristic biases of dominant groups.40 In the article 
of mine that Wells criticizes most directly, I was careful to claim 
no more than that Hart & Wechsler's Legal Process approach 
provides "one view of the cathedral"4t-by no means a unique 
perspective, but one capable of generating genuine insights. 
Based on at least a partial misunderstanding of what the Hart & 
Wechsler paradigm is or is for, Wells's criticisms do not respond 
39. A paradigm that purported to justify everything would of course explain noth-
ing, and I do not mean to deny the existence of important Federal Courts cases in which a 
relatively crude purpose of reaching a particular substantive outcome on the facts 
presented appears to have played a crucial role. See, for example, Michigan v. Long, 463 
U.S. 1032 (1983); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina EnvtL Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978). 
Nor would I deny that judges and Justices have frequently displayed more concern to 
frame particular doctrines in accord with their substantive views than to achieve princi-
pled consistency among decided cases or doctrinal categories. I therefore do not mean to 
contend that Wells's descriptive critique draws no blood-only that, because he misun-
derstands the Hart & Wechsler paradigm, he draws less blood than he seems to think. 
40. Compare Resnik, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 1021-22, 1033-47 (cited in note 22) (devel-
oping themes of exclusion of groups and perspectives in history, doctrine, and practice). 
41. Fallon, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 972 (cited in note 2), quoting Guido Calabresi and A. 
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One Vrew of the 
Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972). 
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directly to this claim or provide clear answers to the questions 
that lie behind it. 
IV. CONTRASTING NORMATIVE VISIONS 
The gist of Wells's normative critique is that the Hart & 
Wechsler paradigm overvalues federalism, the separation of pow-
ers, the rule of law, and principled consistency, "coherence," or 
"integrity."42 These values possess only limited force, he thinks, 
which should sometimes give way to other concerns. To evaluate 
this criticism again requires understanding the Hart & Wechsler 
paradigm from the inside. 
A. LAw AND REASON 
Within the Hart & Wechsler paradigm, the value of princi-
pled consistency or coherence is closely, almost conceptually re-
lated to a theory of law and the judicial role. That implicit 
theory, which I have described as "antipositivist," recognizes a 
profound judicial role in an organic process of lawmaking. 
Within this theory, however, a judge may not use her office sim-
ply to legislate her own preferences. The judge possesses moral 
warrant to speak in the name of the law precisely insofar as she is 
able to relate her decision to the relevant body of authoritative 
texts, principles, and policies in ways countenanced by the con-
ventions of legal argument. To act lawfully, she must address 
herself to authoritative texts, policies, and principles; she must 
reason with and about them in a conscientious effort to distill or 
elaborate the rule or principle to be applied; and she must justify 
her exercise of power by providing a reasoned account of the 
connection between relevant legal materials and the disposition 
that she reaches. 
This, of course, is an ideal that sometimes is honored only in 
the breach. It is subject to question on the ground that it is at 
bottom a somewhat conservative ideal, which links the law of to-
day to texts propounded and principles established in the past. It 
is, finally, an ideal whose attractiveness resides at least partly in 
the positivistic alternative it rejects, according to which the law is 
what some official-which might be a judge-says that it is, re-
gardless of her reasons for so saying. 
Wells's critical claim, if I grasp it, stands in stark contrast, 
and it reduces to this: it would be normatively preferable for 
Supreme Court Justices, at least, to be authorized by law to de-
42. See Wells, 11 Const. Comm. at 576 (cited in note 1). 
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cide individual cases without obligation to provide reasoned, 
principled justifications. The Court, in his preferred model, is a 
lawgiver, and subject to no more legal restraints than Hobbes's 
Leviathan.43 
The costs of Wells's alternative, which inversely reflect the 
virtues of the Hart & Wechsler approach, are relatively obvious 
and need not be belabored. They include potential loss of demo-
cratic legitimacy (if, for example, the Court arbitrarily and with-
out reasoned explanation were to defy Congress); demoralization 
to those who attempt to make reasoned sense of ostensibly con-
trolling legal materials and expect to see them applied fairly and 
nondiscriminatorily; and unfairness to those whose rights or in-
terests are sacrificed on unprincipled bases. 
The last of these considerations-unfairness to litigants-
obviously troubles Wells himself. When he faces this implication, 
near the end of his article, his first line of response is that no 
palpable unfairness will result; his claims extend only to jurisdic-
tional holdings, which are less clear and important in their conse-
quences than decisions on the merits.44 As he recognizes, 
however, he has blocked this retreat by his own relentless argu-
ment that jurisdictional decisions are commonly driven by a de-
sire to affect substantive outcomes and that their substantive 
implications are large.4s 
With the costs of rejecting principle readily apparent, Wells's 
preference for his normatively "realist" theory ultimately rests, 
as it must, on an appeal to consequences.46 His theory, he sug-
gests, would permit the attainment of desirable results and the 
drawing of useful distinctions that the Hart & Wechsler paradigm 
precludes. Unfortunately, however, his argument is both over-
stated and unclear. 
B. PRINCIPLED AND UNPRINCIPLED DISTINCTIONS 
The problem begins with Wells's characterization of the 
Hart & Wechsler paradigm, which once again is stingy and inapt. 
Equating the Hart & Wechsler paradigm with the most wooden 
43. I discuss the constraints that Wells thinks are imposed by philosophical pragma-
tism below. 
44. See Wells, 11 Const. Comm. at 583-85 (cited in note 1). 
45. See id. at 585. 
46. Interestingly, Wells sometimes appears equivocal about promising the usual 
pragmatic vindication of the pragmatic ~e~hod-a hi~er l.'roport~on of .results that 
"work." Ever the realist, he seems to antlctpate a contmuat10n of tdeologtcal warfare 
among judges and Justices of differing political views producing a good deal of "incoher-
ence." See id. at 583. 
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formalism, Wells sometimes writes as if those operating within it 
could draw no distinctions at all. To take just one example, he 
argues that it would be possible under his preferred approach, 
but impliedly not under the Hart & Wechsler paradigm, to justify 
broad standing to enforce the Establishment Clause, "while de-
nying [standing] for claims brought to enforce other constitu-
tional provisions that create no personal constitutional rights."47 
In fact, however, the Hart & Wechsler paradigm by no means 
precludes all distinctions-only unprincipled ones. And the dis-
tinction between constitutional provisions that create personal 
rights and those that do not happens to be entirely principled. It 
could easily be drawn within the Hart & Wechsler paradigm, and 
in fact has been urged as crucial for standing law by other schol-
ars in prominent articles,48 most if not all of which lie well within 
the Legal Process tradition. 
C. UNPRINCIPLED DECISIONS AND INCOHERENCE 
After the permissibility of principled distinctions is clarified, 
a part of Wells's normative critique of course remains: he asserts 
that desirable consequences could justify genuinely unprincipled 
jurisdictional decisions, even if the result is "incoherence."49 But 
what he means by this claim is never made clear. In the strong 
sense, "incoherence" implies unintelligibilityso-a body of law so 
garbled as to be incomprehensible. Law that was incoherent in 
this sense could not be followed; according to one view, "inco-
herent law" is an oxymoron, as nonsensical a notion as a "round 
square."st Wells obviously has a weaker sense of "incoherence" 
in mind-possibly incoherence as "lacking orderly continuity" or 
"inconsistent."sz To the extent that either implies the absence of 
rationally discernible standards, however, incoherence seems 
self-evidently inefficient, demoralizing, and unjust. 
Wells, then, must intend to invoke a still weaker sense of 
"incoherence," perhaps as "not 'mutually supporting' " or " 'not 
derivable from a set of principles which are completely [lexically] 
47. ld. at 584. 
48. See, for example, Fletcher, 98 Yale LJ. at 223-24,265-80 (cited in note 25); Lee 
Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Su"ogate for Claim 
for Relief, 83 Yale LJ. 425 (1974). 
49. See Wells, 11 Const. Comm. at 582 (cited in note 1). 
50. See, for example, Joseph Raz, The Relevance of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. Rev. 273, 
276 (1992). 
51. See Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale U. Press, 2d ed. 1969). 
52. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language (3d 
ed. 1966). 
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ranked.' "53 But this would be an artificially contrived sense of 
"incoherence," suggesting that distinctions are almost inherently 
incoherent whenever legal or moral values are pluralistic and not 
susceptible of lexical ordering. Legal, moral, and linguistic ex-
periences are all to the contrary.s4 When competing principles 
are involved, nothing is more familiar or more sensible than that 
distinctions should be drawn, such that one principle prevails in 
one type of case and another principle in the other. Sometimes 
courts may state the applicable principle too broadly. If so, it is 
the characteristic art of lawyers and successor courts, not to 
charge "incoherence," but to discern patterns, to draw further 
distinctions, and to create the kind of order necessary for what 
we call "law." 
In any event, Wells never makes clear what sort of unprinci-
pled or inconsistent decisionmaking he wants to justify. Does he 
mean, for example, that the Supreme Court should feel free to 
deny the existence of federal jurisdiction in any case involving 
rights that a majority of the Justices dislike? That the Court 
should assert jurisdiction not conferred by Congress if the Court 
thinks that federal jurisdiction would be desirable? I think this is 
the kind of case that Wells has in mind, but, again, I am not sure. 
Assuming that this is the kind of decisionmaking Wells 
means to promote, I think it fair to say that his case is at best 
unproved. With the costs both evident and important, he fails to 
provide concrete examples of genuinely unprincipled decisions 
(that could not be reached within the Hart & Wechsler para-
digm) that would do the great good necessary to offset the costs 
discussed above. He similarly fails to explain why his preferred 
jurisprudential model would not license the most revolting judi-
cial arbitrariness. 
Against this charge, Wells would undoubtedly invoke the 
philosophical theory that inspires his critique: pragmatism, with 
its ideal of decisionmaking that "works" and achieves satisfactory 
53. See Raz, 72 B.U. L. Rev. at 2TI, 286 (cited in note 50). Wells refers to this 
article in the somewhat opaque footnote in which he discusses possible meanings of "in-
coherence." See Wells, 11 Const. Comm. at 5TI n.81 (cited in note 1). At the end of that 
footnote, Wells suggests that legal doctrine is "incoherent" when it draws distinctions 
supported by "no good reason." I leave this suggestion aside, however, since Wells pur-
ports to be defending "incoherent" decisionmaking, and he offers no arguments attempt-
ing to justify decisionmaking supported by "no good reason." 
54. Professor Raz's article, from which the quoted formulations were drawn, talks 
much more about degrees of coherence, or about some principles or decisions being more 
or less coherent than others, than about incoherence. See Raz, 72 B.U. L. Rev. at, for 
example, 286,293 (cited in note 50). Raz himself is a value pluralist, and he argues firmly 
that "value pluralism does not mean incoherence." Id. at 310. 
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results. The pragmatic method, he seems to assume, would sup-
ply all requisite safeguards and discipline. Too often, however, 
"pragmatism" is an honorific title for wooliness masquerading al-
ternately as profundity and common sense. Without fuller elabo-
ration, "pragmatism" is not a helpful answer to any practical 
question. 
Among other things, pragmatism as an unelaborated con-
cept affords no answer to the fundamental Legal Process ques-
tion of who should have what power to make authoritative 
judgments-pragmatic or otherwise-on behalf of the legal sys-
tem. Wells would not, I assume, wish to entrust cops on the beat 
with the authority to do whatever they thought pragmatically 
best. Yet his article is curiously lacking in straightforward argu-
ments concerning why courts should be entrusted with the power 
he would grant them. It is a familiar point that rules limiting 
judicial authority will have adverse consequences in cases in 
which, but for the rules, courts would do the "right" thing.ss 
From the perspective of systemic design, however, it is equally 
familiar that there may still be good reasons not to vest courts 
with an unconstrained discretion-or, what amounts to the same 
thing, to vest them with the authority to do whatever is "right" in 
an all-things-considered sense in every case. Among other con-
siderations, it may be fairer or more democratically legitimate to 
leave some decisions to other institutions. There may also be 
reason to doubt that courts are more likely than some other deci-
sionmaker to be able to identify what indeed is "right." 
V. HARD QUESTIONS 
To deny the adequacy of Wells's answers is not to deny the 
validity of his questions. Most of us assume that judges do, and 
sometimes we think they should, exploit all possible room for 
legal maneuver-maybe even bend or stretch a bit-to reach 
what seem to them to be just or desirable outcomes in cases 
where the stakes are high. When, if ever, is this practice consis-
tent with the defining principles of the Legal Process approach? 
Does the Hart & Wechsler paradigm permit sufficient flexibility 
of this kind? If not, should it be modified? Would the required 
modification amount to abandonment? Or should the para-
digm's absolutist pretensions-if it indeed holds them-be re-
laxed to recognize that ideals may sometimes yield without 
ceasing to be ideals? 
55. See Frederick Schauer, Playing By the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of 
Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life (Clarendon Press, 1991). 
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It may be worth recalling that Wells is not the first to raise 
questions such as these or to deny that principle should control 
every legal decision. Alexander Bickel, for example, famously 
argued that the Supreme Court should be able to decline jurisdic-
tion for reasons of prudence and expediency.s6 It is equally pos-
sible to imagine an argument that the Supreme Court should be 
authorized to ignore ordinary jurisdictional barriers in order to 
decide cases of exceptional national interest.s7 More generally, 
Frederick Schauer has argued that legal norms that are binding 
on courts in relatively ordinary cases might be viewed as subject 
to displacement in cases involving high moral or consequential 
stakes. 
The questions raised by arguments that carefully circum-
scribe the class of cases in which "unprincipled" decisions should 
be allowed are both difficult and important.ss Among the diffi-
culties is whether it would indeed be unprincipled for the legal 
system to recognize legal rights and entitlements as being implic-
itly subject to a balancing calculus and thus capable of being out-
weighed by sufficiently compelling government interests-a 
matter that I cannot go into here. If the argument for excep-
tional rules in exceptional cases were cast in relatively narrow 
terms, I have suggested that there would be room for argument 
about whether the Hart & Wechsler paradigm should be viewed 
as unyielding-as requiring principled decisions regardless of the 
consequences-or should instead be regarded as identifying 
norms applicable to all but extraordinary cases.s9 Suggestively, 
Wells associates Professor Bickel, who held a view of the latter 
kind, with the Hart & Wechsler paradigm.60 I am inclined to do 
so also. 
As the breadth of association broadens, however, the ques-
tion arises whether it is even useful to talk of a "Hart & Wechsler 
paradigm" in the very broad sense in which both Wells and I 
have used the term. This question bothers me increasingly. 
56. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at 
the Bar of Politics (Yale U. Press, 2d ed, 1986). 
57. See Schauer, 14 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol. at 674-79 (cited in note 38). 
58. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and the Powers of Gov-
ernment, 27 Ga. L. Rev. 343 (1993) (arguing that rights are reducible to interests and 
therefore subject to balancing). By any reasonable standard, however, a decision should 
count as unprincipled if not articulately justified by reference to defensible grounds for 
judicial decision. 
59. Compare Bickel (cited in note 56) above with Gerald Gunther, The Subtle VICes 
of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 
Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1964). 
60. See Wells, 11 Const. Comm. at 576-78 (cited in note 1). 
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VI. THE VIRTUES OF A PRAGMATIC CRITIQUE 
Despite my generally critical response, Wells's critique of 
the Hart & Wechsler paradigm, especially when conjoined with 
his effort to develop a pragmatic alternative, has one great virtue. 
His stance invites endless questions, challenges to stale assump-
tions, the puncturing of orthodoxy, and the search for better an-
swers to old and new questions alike. 
The Hart & Wechsler paradigm, as I have used the term, is 
more dynamic than Wells suggests.6t Without some degree of 
dynamism, it could not have maintained the influence that Wells 
agrees with me in ascribing to it. Perhaps, however, more of the 
questions with which the Hart & Wechsler paradigm has re-
dounded should be turned back on the paradigm itself. Perhaps 
its assumptions should be treated as more questionable or defea-
sible. Perhaps those working within the paradigm should attend 
more carefully to the voices of people who have regarded its 
characteristic analysis as mystified, insensitive, smug, apologetic, 
and obfuscatory.6z 
Wells's article, with its summons to a new pragmatism in 
Federal Courts analysis, is right to insist that methodological 
questions deserve to be addressed. Assumptions, posits, and 
stipulations easily become stultifying, and those who work within 
the Hart & Wechsler paradigm should rise to the challenges that 
Wells and the pragmatic paradigm put to us. I do not think that 
Hart & Wechsler's Legal Process paradigm bars us from doing 
so, but the prod to self-examination is valuable nonetheless. 
61. Law, as Henry Hart once put it, is always in a process of becoming, and what it 
ought to be-in our culture, at least-is a part of genuine legal debate. Hart, 64 Harv. L. 
Rev. at 930 (cited in note 34). 
62. See Resnik, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 1021-22, 1035-47 (cited in note 22). 
